In the venerable Peanuts comic strip, the character of Linus perpetually totes around a “security blanket”. The purpose of such a blanket is to provide the feeling of personal security through its familiarity, even though it is laughable that the old blanket provides any real protection in a practical sense. Unfortunately, the same psychological status is also given to nuclear weapons, with much more serious political, military and budgetary consequences. As suggested by Cheryl Rofer at WhirledView, the time has long since passed to rethink the foundations of U.S. nuclear weapons policy.

I hope that my good friend Michael van der Galien will not be offended if I critique his embrace of Linus’ view on nuclear weapons:

The US cannot afford to destroy its nuclear weapons. The more nuclear weapons the US has, the safer the world is…The world is a Hobbesian place. We’d better realize that and behave accordingly.

Michael’s view of the world in stark realist terms as a “Hobbesian place” is fair enough and well within the mainstream of international relations scholarship. But what is left undefined is exactly how a theoretically unlimited number of nuclear weapons supposedly provides security in such a world. If building more and more nuclear weapons could be demonstrated to provide such security in the post-Cold War era, then such a position would at least seriously contend for a U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Unfortunately, however, no such analysis seems apparent in Michael’s post or in the other pro-nuclear weapons expansion advocacies I have encountered in my own admittedly non-comprehensive research.

Let us begin with the notion that the foundation of a sound nuclear weapons policy must be a concept of how such weapons can or could be used to provide security. We may take notice of broad moral objections to war in general or nuclear weapons in particular, but I agree with Michael and others that such idealistic notions cannot be the end-all, be-all of a U.S. national security policy. The price of unbridled idealism might too easily be national suicide as those not so bound by moral scruples exploit them in others. It is reasonable to grant to realists the fundamental claim that the world is at least a potentially dangerous place and that security policies must be designed to respond to danger with force when necessary.

So the fundamental question that must begin the debate over a post-Cold War nuclear weapons policy in the U.S. is: Can nuclear weapons enhance U.S. security, and if so, how? General Lee Butler, retired former commander of the United States’ nuclear weapons forces, has a surprising answer: Nuclear weapons in actuality provide very limited contributions to U.S. national security. The reason is that nuclear weapons are politically and militarily virtually unusable.

Politically, use of nuclear weapons is a global taboo. Any use of nuclear weapons in a situation where any other option — even one that was only partially effective — was available would be condemned by enemies and allies alike as an intolerable action. Even while realists might have little patience for the normative blatherings of liberals and constructivists, they must ultimately acknowledge that violation of a global normative taboo would have material consequences through the actions of others. The loss of support from long-time U.S. allies resulting from a use of nuclear weapons would inevitably outweigh almost any conceivable military or strategic advantage. Use of nuclear weapons would also give our enemies a huge propaganda tool. The United States has already been cudgeled for 60 years by its enemies for being the only country to use atomic weapons in war. Another such use would be be claimed as a gift by anti-American propagandists and jihadists in their global recruitment campaigns. Furthermore, use of nuclear weapons would ironically signal weakness and desperation on the part of the United States rather than strength and determination. This political side-effect was, in fact, one of the reasons that Truman rejected McArthur’s demand to be granted atomic weapons for use against China during the Korean War.

Politically, expansion of the nuclear weapons arsenal also provokes unintended consequences that may ultimately undermine U.S. security. Because the U.S. is by far the most powerful country in the world, it tends (whether it wants to or not) to provide the very definition of what constitutes a “powerful” or “developed” country. Other countries seeking to obtain so-called “great power status” tend to imitate the “great powers” that already exist. After all, what better way to achieve the global status and respect accorded to a “great power” than to share in all of the same characteristics that others granted that status have? And as long as the United States continues to define it power in nuclear terms, it is unsurprising that imitators will try to do the same. Such considerations were certainly present in India’s drive to make its nuclear weapons capability real. Furthermore, the weapons thus produced are often not secured as safely as the U.S. nuclear force. The U.S. already must contend with grave scenarios of “loose nukes” emanating from the former Soviet Union or from a future jihadist Pakistan and falling into the hands of terrorist groups that would be impossible to deter in the traditional sense. It simply makes no sense to provide an unintentional encouragement for other states seeking a quick road to “great power” status with a route that ultimately just produces new threats to the U.S. This is not to say that all nuclear proliferation is driven by imitation of the United States, but it is foolhardy to produce even a limited incentive towards nuclear proliferation unless it is absolutely necessary to do so.

Militarily, nuclear weapons are often self-defeating. This strikes to the heart of the realist concern with national security based on practical material realities. The purpose of most military operations is to take territory or at least remove from territory some impediment to future operations, such as a fortification, factory, or command center. Use of nuclear weapons to do so, however, produces more problems than it solves. The resultant poisoning of the target and its surrounding area requires future operations to be conducted with cumbersome protective gear. Additionally, any future use of the area for military or civilian purposes is often impossible. Furthermore, the flow of refugees and the flood of non-lethal casualties resulting from a nuclear explosion often produces military problems vastly more difficult than those produced by the target that was eliminated.

The only situation where nuclear weapons could be used by the United States without provoking a political reaction that would vastly outweigh any possible benefits of such use and where the military consequences would not be ultimately self-destructive would be if the United States itself were attacked by another country with weapons of mass destruction. Any U.S. nuclear weapons policy should seek to shape the nuclear force solely for that contingency. Of course, anti-nuclear critics might contend that other countries face the same political and military disincentives to use nuclear weapons that General Butler points out constrain the United States. That may be true, but we should not bet national survival on it. It is reasonable to maintain a carefully-designed nuclear force as a deterrent against enemy leaders that may value only their own personal or national survival and power. In this regard, I would part company with General Butler and argue that his absolute abolitionist approach goes too far. I agree with General Butler and his allies that “can never be used for any rational military or political purpose”, but I would point out that the word “rational” is doing a lot of work in that sentence. It is responsible for the United States to maintain a deterrent nuclear force against potential opponents that are rational enough to deter, but who’s “rational” ends might allow them to use nuclear weapons against us otherwise.

However, since deterrence against others with nuclear, chemical, or biological capabilities is the only legitimate use of nuclear weapons, a post-Cold War nuclear weapons policy in the United States should be designed specifically for that end. Furthermore, because maintenance of nuclear weapons is extremely expensive — at least $6.5 billion per year in maintenance costs alone, leaving aside the costs of any new generation of nuclear weapons development or deployment as well as the tendency of maintenance costs to increase as the existing force ages.

It would therefore be reasonable to look towards making deep cuts in our existing arsenal of land, air, and sea-based nuclear forces. The cuts could be made with an eye towards survivability of the nuclear force, prioritizing deployment on submarines which are impervious to any comprehensive first strike or pre-emptive attack. Such a redesign of U.S. nuclear weapons policy would serve to recognize and minimize the costs and negative side-effects of nuclear weapons ownership while maintaining them in their sole useful role of deterrence.

And it would stop treating nuclear bombs as a security blanket.