My friend Jeb Koogler – who still writes for my blog-home The Moderate Voice – wrote an op-ed with Joshua Foust, which was published in today’s Christian Science Monitor. The subject of the op-ed is “Myths in Al Qaeda’s ‘Home:’ Policymakers Need to Grasp Cultural Realities in Pakistan’s Tribal Area.”

The subject is an important one; all too often, Western policymakers – albeit especially Americans – don’t seem to grasp the complexities and nuances in the rest of the world. All too often they seem to assume that one can craft policies on a black and white vision of the world; a caricature.

Some of the myths about the tribal region of Pakistan, where Al Qaeda is hiding and organization:

Conventional wisdom suggests that the Pakistani Taliban pose a unique and insurmountable threat, that the Pashtuns are the problem, that the tribal areas are lawless and chaotic, and that the targeted assassinations are an effective deterrent against Islamic militancy. But none of these assertions are accurate.

Although the conventional thinking holds that the Pakistani Taliban and their leader Baitullah Mehsud are a formidable and unprecedented threat to the region, the movement is neither historically unique nor overwhelmingly powerful…

Mainstream beliefs about the Pashtuns are also based on inaccuracies. While the Pashtuns, the dominant ethnic group in the FATA, are often portrayed as rebellious and violent, scant attention is paid to the overwhelming majority of them who live peacefully. As militants have swarmed tourist paradises such as the Swat Valley, the contrast between the small number of militants and the vastly larger number of nonmilitant Pashtuns who oppose them is striking…

Contrary to another myth, the Pakistani tribal areas do have an established system of order. Historically, the FATA has been ruled either through bribery from a foreign power or by their own village elders. Many central governments have had productive relationships with local elders, albeit on local terms. Furthermore, although Pashtunwali – the unwritten code of conduct similar to medieval chivalry – receives much attention for being capricious and violent, it is nonetheless a stable method of self-rule that has long governed the area.

Most destructive of conventional thinking is the notion that targeted assassinations of militant leaders in the FATA is an effective counterterrorism tactic. In fact, this strategy has not deterred Islamic militancy.

It’s important to understand that much of our ‘knowledge’ isn’t based on facts; policymakers should design policy based on facts, not caricatures.