Japan In Post-U.S. World
Robert Dujarric writes:
Besides the economic damage, the global financial crisis has dangerous strategic implications for Japan.
Since 1945, the world has been organized along U.S.-centric lines. By providing security guarantees to its allies, Washington has supplied an international public good to the entire planet. Even countries not aligned with the United States, such as China or Russia, benefit from this U.S.-led regime which generally keeps the peace in key regions of the globe.
This in turns makes possible an international trade and investment system that is conducive to economic growth. Therefore, the U.S. performs on a global scale the same role as the Tokyo police do locally by providing us with a public good — namely safe streets — thanks to which we can enjoy productive lives free of crime.
Unfortunately, America’s capability to offer these public services has been impaired. First, the Iraq war and the failure of U.S. policy in the rest of southwest Asia have severely undermined U.S. power. Second, the financial crisis weakens the U.S.
The inability of the U.S. government to craft a swift and coherent response to the subprime collapse, the withering of the authority of the president and the pathetic performance of both parties in Congress, gave the (accurate) impression that there was no one at the helm in Washington. Recent measures have only partially restored American credibility.
This means that Japan and other countries will have to look beyond the U.S. They will have to cope with the changes. Those who don’t change, lose.
Consequently, Japan will have to be more active on the diplomatic stage to compensate for a shortage of American leadership. What does this entail?
* Integrating China in the process to stabilize the global financial system. Japan should engage Beijing to think about how China can contribute to safeguarding a system in which both China and Japan have an enormous stake.
* Taking a more dynamic role in Korean affairs. The nuclear issue itself is not the key question, since U.S. deterrence is still functional. Nor is the abduction issue relevant to Japan’s national interest. But Japan needs to plan for the implosion of North Korea, which though not probable is not impossible. Tokyo needs to discuss this with Seoul and Beijing to come up with an action plan. This is not a U.S. priority but Japan cannot wait until Washington (re)awakens to Korea’s importance.
* Energy saving and non-oil energy. Japan is a leader in this field, which has the advantage of requiring no military power. Thus it could take the lead in providing an international public good, i.e., new and better ways to eliminate, or at least diminish, the need for oil. This would help the ecological and the security environments since oil pollutes and happens to be located in unstable and violent regions.
Japan has potential, as do many other countries. I think that we will see radical changes in the coming ten to twenty years, in which more countries become economic powerhouses, and in which those countries rely more on themselves and each other than on the U.S.
In the end, this is best for all involved; especially in a constantly globalizing world. When one country’s economy falters, the rest will not have to follow suit, if they rely more on themselves and other major economies. The rest, will be able to pull the one country in trouble up, instead of that one country taking all the other countries down with it.










1. The argument that the US has to react quickly or with mucho gusto to the stock market crisis, is just not valid. The ‘29 Crash, the S&L crisis, Japan’s recession, the ‘97 Thai currency crisis, Russia in’ 98, Mexico – all these events were followed by years of patient policy-making with more or less successful results. What matters is the right policies as events occur in the medium-term that might turn a problem in the financial and housing markets into a depression. Remember, depression did not strt in late ‘29, until Britain dropped gold, both Hoover and FDR tried to balance budgets, and the US protected its markets. Mistakes in ‘97 fed into Russia’s collapse the next year.
2. Japan already hedges against US policy. For instance, it’s Mideast policy often undermines US policy, and Japan is the largest donor in the Asian Development Bank. It’s not Japan that needs the US as much as the US needs Japan to give it any pull in East Asia.
3. At the same time, Japan cannot act strongly in a region where WW2 is not forgotten. It needs US military might, so that it can continue to use yen diplomacy (the Yoshida Doctrine) to placate its neighbors. Japanese bluster will only unite Pyongyang and Seoul, and with a wink from Beijing. The worry is, as happened after Nixon pulled back from Vietnam, is that East Asia will destabilize into competing nationalisms, Chinese versus Japanese (with Seoul most likely following Beijing if not anchored by the US).
3. On energy, yes Japan’s alternative sector is larger than many states, but oil is still necessary. Naval protection of the sea lanes is vital. If the USSeventh Fleet doesn’t do it, either Japan will change its constitution to allow MSDF control, or there will be war. Also, most of Japan’s alternative sector is nuclear, and no one has a solution to waste disposal or surviving earthquakes yet.
Japan with more overt influence is a problem, not a solution, however much I admire Japanese culture.