Normalize and Disarm: The Best Approach to North Korea
‘North Korea blinked first in its latest diplomatic showdown with the United States. In return for its removal from the U.S. list of terrorist states, Pyongyang made a significant concession that was not required under the terms of the October 2007 agreement linking North Korean denuclearization steps to U.S. moves toward normalized relations,’ Selig Harrison writes for the International Herald Tribune.
‘The United States agreed in the 2007 accord to remove North Korea from the terrorist list if it carried out two key commitments: dismantle its plutonium production program and provide a formal declaration listing in detail all of its plutonium-related facilities and stating how much weapons-grade plutonium it has reprocessed.’
Pyongyang’s readiness to compromise reflected a recognition that a collapse of the negotiations would make it difficult for the next administration in Washington to continue the pursuit of denuclearization and normalization.
Significantly, this recognition appears to be shared by the nationalistic hard-line generals in the governing National Defense Commission who have gained in day-to-day power during the illness of Chairman Kim Jong Il…
To get the intrusive inspections necessary to allay suspicions of hidden plutonium or uranium facilities, the United States should move as quickly as possible to normalize relations. Normalization would speed up the denuclearization process.
The Bush Administration’s slogan during its fitful on-again, off-again negotiations with North Korea has been “Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Disarmament.” “Our slogan,” Kim Gye Gwan told me, is “Complete, Verifiable, Irreversible Normalization.”
It is becoming increasingly clear that the United States would be wise to adopt a less hawkish policy towards the North. Allowing it to develop more nuclear weapons is quite obviously not an option, but it seems that the North’s leaders realize that if they do not cooperate quickly with the U.S., their country might collapse.
As with all politicians, they seem willing to do whatever it takes to remain in power. If this means abandoning their nuclear program, so be it.
The West would be wise to tap into that sense of self-preservation the North’s generals and bureaucrats possess, and start negotiating for real. In the end, the North’s leaders are no religious extremists believing they will become ‘martyrs’ celebrated in heaven if they die in war.
