In the latest in a long series of “sky is falling” reports about trends in terrorism, a Congressional task force has proclaimed that an attack using biological or nuclear weapons is likely by the end of 2013.  Of course, the threat is real in the abstract.  Groups like al-Qaeda have made no secret of their desire to obtain and use nuclear, biological, chemical, or radiological weapons.  This report, however, appears to raise more questions than it answers.

First, the report’s calculation of 2013 as a point by which WMD use is probable is strange.  The four-year period seems calculated for political effect (the next four years coincides with the next presidential term) and thus does not appear to be a sober and neutral assessment.  The purpose of the report seems to be to build up a threat sufficient to warrant actions which would be funded and staffed through particular government agencies, with corresponding benefits in their intercene budget battles.  Every area of the government periodically produces reports that amount to “give us more money or the world will end” and this report seems to possibly be the same thing.  The invocation of WMD is an impressive rhetorical tool.  At times like this, it is difficult to tell whether the threat is as grave as they say or whether it may be exaggerated a bit to gain ground in the D.C. budget wars.

The recommendations in the report are, for the most part, common-sense recyclings of similar recommendations made in earlier reports: improve security for nuclear materials in Pakistan and the former Soviet Union, increase surveillence and interdiction against smuggling networks, and counter moves by Iran and North Korea towards nuclear weapons.  These goals are relatively uncontroversial and have been so for a long time.  What is missing is the “how” part of the answer.

For example, while the task force recommends diplomatic engagement to constrain North Korean behavior, they do not explain how diplomacy alone can reliably counteract North Korea’s longstanding record of breaking agreements, splitting hairs to evade and obstruct agreements, and bizarre and apparently random changes of course.  Also, what if a regime in North Korea or Iran feels fundamentally threatened by the unchecked potential of the United States to take unilateral military action against them without effective consequences and seeks a nuclear capability as a way of deterring America?  A diplomatic approach that fails to take into account the real incentives for proliferation is doomed to failure.

A similar problem constrains the effectiveness of projects to secure nuclear materials in Pakistan and the former Soviet Union.  To the extent that such projects are led and staffed by the United States, the Pakistani and former Soviet states that cooperate risk being seen as U.S. puppets for doing so.  Th efforts of the United States to strengthen those governments’ control over their nuclear materials might perversely wind up politically undermining the governments themselves.  Alternatively — and especially in Putin’s increasingly nationalist Russia — state leaders may want to reject cooperation with the United States for their own reasons.

The bottom line is that while we will be hearing a lot about this report due to its invocation of the dreaded “WMD” category, it does not on its face appear to be a serious contribution to policy-making.  Instead, it is a long-standing ritual — telling the new President that the sky in falling and that the only way to prop it up is to give someone more money to do exactly the same things they were doing anyway.  Meanwhile, we hope and pray that a more fundamental strategic reassessment isn’t required.