Writing for Foreign Affairs, John Mueller explains that many have ignored the problematic relationship between Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the last two decades, or so. This was not a coalition out of love, but out of necessity.

President Barack Obama insists that the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is about “making sure that al Qaeda cannot attack the U.S. homeland and U.S. interests and our allies” or “project violence against” American citizens. The reasoning is that if the Taliban win in Afghanistan, al Qaeda will once again be able to set up shop there to carry out its dirty work. As the president puts it, Afghanistan would “again be a base for terrorists who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.” This argument is constantly repeated but rarely examined; given the costs and risks associated with the Obama administration’s plans for the region, it is time such statements be given the scrutiny they deserve.

Multiple sources, including Lawrence Wright’s book The Looming Tower, make clear that the Taliban was a reluctant host to al Qaeda in the 1990s and felt betrayed when the terrorist group repeatedly violated agreements to refrain from issuing inflammatory statements and fomenting violence abroad. Then the al Qaeda-sponsored 9/11 attacks — which the Taliban had nothing to do with — led to the toppling of the Taliban’s regime. Given the Taliban’s limited interest in issues outside the “AfPak” region, if they came to power again now, they would be highly unlikely to host provocative terrorist groups whose actions could lead to another outside intervention. And even if al Qaeda were able to relocate to Afghanistan after a Taliban victory there, it would still have to operate under the same siege situation it presently enjoys in what Obama calls its “safe haven” in Pakistan.

The very notion that al Qaeda needs a secure geographic base to carry out its terrorist operations, moreover, is questionable. After all, the operational base for 9/11 was in Hamburg, Germany. Conspiracies involving small numbers of people require communication, money, and planning — but not a major protected base camp.

Eric Martin responds at American Footprints:

In addition to Lawrence Wright, Steve Coll makes the same argument in The Bin Ladens: namely, that the Taliban and al-Qaeda were not natural allies, willing to support each primarily out of a religious or ideological affinity. On the contrary, Osama bin Laden had to lavish enormous amounts of money on Taliban leaders in order to stay in their good graces. In addition to other tributes, Osama employed his construction know-how to build palaces, homes and other facilities for Taliban leaders. Without those sweeteners, it is unlikely that the Taliban would have long tolerated what was, essentially, a band of problematic interlopers with an agenda that was irrelevant to the inwardly directed Afghans.

Now that the Taliban has been made aware of the sizable costs that they could and would incur should they decide to reprise their previous landlord/tenant relationship with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, it is less likely that they would be so inclined. And now that the US and other nations have are taking the task of disrupting al-Qaeda’s financing networks seriously (with time, money and other resources dedicated to the cause), it would be harder for Osama and others to generate the funds needed to buy their way in.

Both men could be right. In fact, they are right when they say that the Taliban and Al Qaeda did not truly get along well. It was a marriage of convenience, not love.

Having said that, I fear that a simplification of the above may lead some to believe that it is perfectly fine to let the Taliban take back Afghanistan. The Taliban were partially responsible for the 9/11 attacks, and have been responsible for many other terrorist attacks ever since. Additionally, they have destabilized an entire country (Pakistan), or at least a sizeable part of it (the tribal region).

The Taliban were once focused on Afghanistan itself. That seems to have changed. They do not merely want to implement Sharia in Afghanistan, they are also busily trying to transform at least a part of Pakistan into Afghanistan II.

One last point: the Taliban are radicals who want to oppress an entire people. Letting them take over control of Afghanistan constitutes a crime against humanity.